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1 Introduction 
The goal of this study is to reveal the long-term trajectory of Russian economic 
development and to make predictions for the future. The study starts with a much 
discussed question: why Russia did worse economically during transition than most 
other countries in Europe and Asia? It is argued that it was partly caused by objective 
circumstances before transition (distortions in industrial structure and in trade patterns 
accumulated during the era of central planning), but mostly by the weakening of the 
institutional capacity of the state during transition.  
 
The second argument deals with the reasons for the institutional collapse that was more 
pronounced in Russia than either in democratic East Europe (EE) or in authoritarian 
China and Vietnam. Partly these reasons are associated with democratization carried out 
in a poor rule of law environment (in EE countries the rule of law was stronger, whereas 
in China and Vietnam democratization was delayed). A possibly more important reason 
is the long-term trajectory of institutional development; i.e. the historical path from 
traditional collectivist institutions to the modern individual responsibility type. Whereas 
East Europe more or less adopted Western institutions, and China preserved the 
institutional continuity (traditional ‘Asian values’ institutions), Russia and some other 
former Soviet Union (FSU) states found themselves in a ‘no man’s land’—collectivist 
institutions were destroyed, but Western law and order institutions did not take root.   
 
Russian trajectory of economic development is placed into the comparative context. It is 
argued that developing regions that preserved institutional continuity (East Asia, Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), India) have better conditions for growth than regions 
where traditional institutions were largely destroyed (sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Latin 
America (LA), FSU). If this interpretation is correct, the new growth miracles will 
happen in MENA countries like Turkey, Iran, Egypt, whereas Russia together with LA 
and SSA will remain a ‘normal’ developing country with poor institutions, mediocre 
and highly volatile growth. 
2  A ‘normal’ country?  
The world economic recession of 2008-09 hit Russia harder than other countries. 
Russia’s GDP for 2009 fell by about 9 per cent due to the collapse of oil prices and the 
outflow of capital caused by world recession—more than USA, European, and Japanese 
GDP (2, 4, and 5 per cent respectively) and considerably more than the GDP in most 
emerging market economies that did not experience a recession (China registered 
growth of 8 per cent, India 6 per cent, Middle East 2 per cent, SSA 2 per cent).  
 
From 1989 to 1998 Russia experienced a transformational recession—GDP fell to 55 
per cent of the pre-recession 1989 level. In 1999-2008 Russia’s economy was 
recovering at a rate of about 7 per cent a year and barely reached the pre-recession peak   2
of 1989; Figures 1 and 2).1 Now, with some luck, pre-recession 1989 GDP will be 
surpassed in the period 2011-12. In sum, therefore, for two ‘lost decades’, there has 
been no increase in output.  
Figure 1: 2008 GDP as a % of 1989 level 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2009.  
 
In 2005, Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman published an article entitled, ‘A Normal 
Country: Russia after Communism’ (Shleifer and Treisman 2005). They compared 
Russia to Brazil, China, India, Turkey and other developing countries, and argued that, 
in terms of crime, income inequalities, corruption, macroeconomic instability, and other 
curses typical of the third world, Russia is by far not the worst—indeed, somewhere in 
the middle of the list, better than Nigeria, although worse than China. In short, Russia is 
a normal developing country.  
 
                                                 
1 Figure 1 is based on GDP indices (2008 as a percentage of 1989) reported in the EBRD Transition 
Report 2009, whereas Figure 2 reports chain indices (based on annual growth rates) from the same source. 
The discrepancies are not that substantial.     3
The USSR was an abnormal developing country. The Soviet Union put the first man 
into space, had about 20 Nobel Prize winners in science and literature. Out of about 40 
living laureates of the Fields Medal (awarded since 1936 and recognized as the ‘Nobel 
Prize in mathematics’) eight come from former Soviet Union (that had less about 5 per 
cent of world population). The USSR had universal free healthcare and education (the 
best among developing countries) low income inequality and relatively low crime and 
corruption. By 1965, Soviet life expectancy had increased to 70 years—only two years 
less than in the USA, even though per capita income was only 20-25 per cent of the US 
level. 
Figure 2: GDP change in FSU economies 
 
Note: 1989 = 100%. 
Source: EBRD Transition Report (various). 
 
The transition to a market economy in the 1990s brought about the dismantling of the 
Soviet state: the provision of all public goods, from healthcare to law and order, fell 
dramatically. The shadow economy, which the most generous estimates place at 10 per 
cent to 15 per cent of the GDP under Brezhnev, grew to 50 per cent of the GDP by the 
mid 1990s. In 1980-85, the Soviet Union was placed in the middle of a list of 54 
countries rated according to their level of corruption, with a bureaucracy cleaner than 
that of Italy, Greece, Portugal, South Korea and practically all the developing countries.   4
In 1996, after the establishment of a market economy and the victory of democracy, 
Russia came in 48th in the same 54-country list, between India and Venezuela.  
Figure 3: Gini coefficient of income distribution in China and Russia, 1978-2006 
 
Source: Chen et al. (2008); Goskomstat (various). 
Figure 4: Number of billionaires in 2007 and PPP GDP in 2005 (billion US$) by country 
 
Source: Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0324/080.html 
 
Income inequalities increased greatly: the Gini coefficient increased from 26 per cent in 
1986 to 40 per cent in 2000, and then 42 per cent in 2007. The decile coefficient—the 
ratio of incomes of the wealthiest 10 per cent of the population to the incomes of the 
poorest 10 per cent—increased from 8 in 1992 to 14 in 2000, and then to 17 in 2007 
(Figure 3). But the inequalities at the very top increased much faster. In 1995, there was 
no one in Russia worth over US$1 billion; in 2007, according to Forbes, Russia had 53 
billionaires (Figure 4), which propelled the country to second or third place in the world   5
in this regard after the USA (415) and Germany (55). Indeed, Russia had two fewer 
billionaires than Germany, but Russia’s billionaires were worth a total of US$282 
billion (US$37 billion more than Germany’s richest). In 2008, right before the 
recession, the number of billionaires in Russia increased to 86, with a total worth of 
over US$500 billion—a full one-third of national GDP. The Soviet Union was 
abnormal; there were no billionaires at all and there hardly were even dollar millionaires 
(perhaps only a dozen in the shadow economy).  
 
Worst of all, the criminalization of the Russian society grew dramatically in the 1990s. 
Crime had been rising gradually in the Soviet Union since the mid 1960s, but after the 
collapse of the USSR there was an unprecedented surge—in just a few years in the early 
1990s crime and murder rates doubled and reached one of the highest levels in the 
world (Figure 5). By the mid 1990s, the murder rate stood at over 30 people per 100,000 
inhabitants against one to two persons in Western and Eastern Europe, Canada, China, 
Japan, Mauritius, and Israel. Only two countries in the world (not counting some war-
torn, collapsed states in developing countries) had higher murder rates—South Africa 
and Colombia—whereas in countries like Brazil or Mexico this rate is two times lower. 
Even the US murder rate, the highest in developed world—six to seven people per 
100,000 inhabitants—pales in comparison with the Russian one.  
Figure 5: Crime rate (left scale), murder rate and suicide rate (right scale) per 100,000 
inhabitants 
 
Source: Goskomstat (various).  
 
The Russian rate of deaths from external causes (accidents, murders, suicides) had, by 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, skyrocketed to 245 per 100,000 inhabitants. It 
was higher than in any of the 187 countries covered by WHO estimates in 2002; 
equivalent to 2.45 deaths per 1,000 a year, or 159 per 1,000 over 65 years, which was 
the average life expectancy in Russia in 2002. Put differently, if these rates were to 
continue to hold, one out of six Russians born in 2002 would have an ‘unnatural’ death. 
To be sure, in the 1980s, murder, suicide and accidental death rates were already quite 
high in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and Kazakhstan; several   6
times higher than in other former Soviet republics and in East European countries. 
However, they were roughly comparable to those of other countries with the same level 
of development. In the 1990s, these rates rapidly increased, far outstripping those in the 
rest of the world. 
 
Mortality rate grew from 10 per 1,000 in 1990 to 16 per 1,000 in 1994, and stayed at a 
level of 14-16 per 1,000 thereafter (Figure 6). This was a true mortality crisis; a unique 
case in history where mortality rates increased by 60 per cent in just five years without 
any wars, epidemics, or catastrophic volcanic eruptions. Russia had never, in the post-
war period, had mortality rates as high as those in the 1990s. Even in 1950-53, during 
the last years of the Stalin’s regime, with the high death rates in the labour camps and 
the consequences of the wartime malnutrition and wounds, the mortality rate was only 
9-10 per 1,000, as compared to 14-16 in 1994-2008.  
Figure 6: Mortality rate (per 1,000, left scale) and average life expectancy (years, right 
scale) 
 
Source:Goskomstat (various).  
 
Russia became a typical ‘petrostate.’ Few specialists would call the USSR a resource-
based economy, but Russia’s industrial structure changed considerably after the 
transition to the market. For all intents and purpose, the 1990s were the period of rapid 
deindustrialization and ‘resourcialization’ of the Russian economy, and the growth of 
world fuel prices since 1999 seems to have reinforced this trend. The share of output of 
the major resource industries (fuel, energy, metals) in total Russian industrial output 
increased from about 25 per cent to over 50 per cent by the mid 1990s and stayed at this 
high level thereafter. This was partly the result of changing price ratios (greater price 
increases in resource industries), but also due to the fact that the real growth rates of 
output were lower in the non-resource sector. The share of mineral products, metals and 
diamonds in Russian exports increased from 52 per cent in 1990 (USSR) to 67 per cent 
in 1995, and to 81 per cent in 2007, whereas the share of machinery and equipment in   7
exports fell from 18 per cent in 1990 (USSR) to 10 per cent in 1995, and then to below 
6 per cent in 2007.  
 
The share of spending in research and development was 3.5 per cent of GDP in the late 
1980s in the USSR. It has fallen to 1.3 per cent in Russia today (compared with: China 
1.3 per cent; USA, Korea, and Japan 2-3 per cent; Finland 4 per cent; Israel 5 per cent). 
So today’s Russia really looks like a ‘normal’ resource-abundant developing country.  
 
To understand Russia today, one has evaluate the record of the last twenty years. In the 
late 1980s, during Gorbachev’s perestroika, the Soviet Union was aspiring to join the 
club of rich democratic nations, but instead degraded in the next decade to a position of 
a normal developing country that is considered neither democratic nor capable of 
engineering a growth miracle. For some outsiders, a ‘normal developing country’ may 
look better than the ominous superpower posing a threat to Western values. But the 
insiders feel differently. Most Russians want to find a way to modernize the country so 
as to make it prosperous and democratic. However, they also feel that something went 
very wrong during the transition—the policies and political leaders of the 1990s are 
totally discredited.  
 
To understand the popularity of Putin in 2000-08 and now of Putin-Medvedev in 
tandem, one has to bear in mind that Putin’s policy is the de facto denial of across-the-
board-liberalization policies of Yeltsin, his predecessor. It is in essence a modernization 
project intended to put a halt to the degradation of the 1990s. The actual achievements 
of 2000-08 may be modest, but they are real: nearly a decade of economic growth; 
increases in government revenues and spending, accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves, decreases in mortality, murder, and suicide rates, preventing the disintegration 
of the country. When Putin was elected president for the first time in 2000, he received 
53 per cent of the votes. In 2004 he was elected with 71 per cent of the votes, and over 
60 per cent said they would vote for him in September 2007, never mind he was not 
going to run. Even in 2009, in the midst of economic recession, Putin-Medvedev policy 
was getting 50 per cent plus approval rate.   
3  Short-term perspective: why Russia did worse than other post-communist 
economies during transition 
The debates of the 1990s juxtaposed shock therapy strategy to gradualism. The question 
of why Russia had to pay a greater price for economic transition was answered 
differently by those who advocated shock therapy and those who supported gradual 
piecemeal reforms. Shock therapists argued that much of the costs of the reforms should 
be attributed to inconsistencies of policies followed, namely to slow economic 
liberalization and to the inability of the governments and the central banks to fight 
inflation in the first half of the 1990s. On the contrary, the supporters of gradual 
transition stated exactly the opposite, blaming the attempt to introduce conventional 
shock therapy package for all the disasters and misfortunes.  
 
In Popov (2000, 2007a) various explanations of the transformational recession are 
discussed and the alternative explanation is suggested—the collapse of output was 
caused primarily by several groups of factors. First, by greater distortions in the 
industrial structure and external trade patterns on the eve of the transition. Second, by   8
the collapse of state and non-state institutions which occurred in the late 1980s, early 
1990s, and which resulted in chaotic transformation through crisis management instead 
of organized and manageable transition. And third, by poor economic policies, which 
basically consisted of bad macroeconomic policy and import substitution industrial 
policy. Finally, fourth, the speed of reforms (economic liberalization) affected 
performance negatively at the stage of the reduction of output because enterprises were 
forced to restructure faster that they possibly could (due to limited investment 
potential), but positively at the recovery stage.  
 
(1)  In the first approximation, economic recession that occurred in FSU states 
was associated with the need to reallocate resources in order to correct the inefficiencies 
in industrial structure inherited from centrally planned economy (CPE). These 
distortions included over-militarization and over-industrialization, perverted trade flows 
among former Soviet republics and Comecon countries, excessively large size and poor 
specialization of industrial enterprises and agricultural farms. In most cases these 
distortions were more pronounced in Russia than in Eastern Europe—not to speak of 
China and Vietnam—the larger the distortions, the greater was the reduction of output. 
The transformational recession, to put it in economic terms, was caused by adverse 
supply shock similar to the one experienced by Western countries after the oil price 
hikes in 1973 and 1979, and similar to post-war recessions caused by conversion of the 
defense industries. 








Source: Popov (2007a).  
 
As Figure 7 shows, the reduction of output in Russia during the transformational 
recession was to a large extent structural in nature; industries with the greatest adverse 
supply shock (deteriorating terms of trade, relative price ratios for outputs and inputs), 
such as light industry, experienced the largest reduction of output. The evidence for all 
transition economies is in Table 1; the reduction of output by country is well explained 
by the indicator of distortions in industrial structure and trade patterns (it remains 
statistically significant no matter what control variables are added). The magnitude of 
distortions, in turn, determines the change in relative prices, when they are deregulated.  
 
The nature of the recession was basically an adverse supply shock caused by the change 
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competitive to competitive industries, which was determined basically by the net 
investment/GDP ratio (gross investment minus retirement of capital stock in the 
competitive industries, since in non-competitive industries the retiring capital stock 
should not be replaced anyway). It was not reasonable to wipe away output in non-
competitive industries faster than capital was being transferred to more efficient 
industries. Market type reforms in many post-communist economies created exactly this 
kind of bottleneck. Countries that followed the shock therapy path found themselves in 
a supply-side recession that is likely to become a textbook example: an excessive speed 
of change in relative prices required the magnitude of restructuring that was simply non-
achievable with the limited pool of investment. Up to half of their economies was made 
non-competitive overnight, output in these non-competitive industries was falling for 
several years and fell in some cases to virtually zero, whereas the growth of output in 
competitive industries was constrained, among other factors, by the limited investment 
potential and was not enough to compensate for the output loss in the inefficient sectors 
(Popov 2000, 2007a).   
 
Hence, at least one general conclusion from the study of the experience of transition 
economies appears to be relevant for the reform process in all countries: provided that 
reforms create a need for restructuring (reallocation of resources), the speed of reforms 
should be such that the magnitude of required restructuring does not exceed the 
investment potential of the economy. In short, the speed of adjustment and restructuring 
in every economy is limited, if only due to the limited investment potential needed to 
reallocate capital stock. This is the main rationale for gradual, rather than instant, 
phasing out of tariff and non-tariff barriers, of subsidies and other forms of government 
support of particular sectors (it took nearly ten years for the European Economic 
Community or for NAFTA to abolish tariffs). This is a powerful argument against shock 
therapy, especially when reforms involved result in a sizable reallocation of resources. 
For Western countries with low trade barriers, low subsidies, low degree of price 
controls, etc., even fast, radical reforms are not likely to require restructuring that would 
exceed the limit of investment potential. But for less developed countries with a lot of 
distortions in their economies supported by explicit and implicit subsidies, fast removal 
of these subsidies could easily result in such a need for restructuring that is beyond the 
ability of the economy due to investment and other constraints. However, such a 
reduction of output due to the inability of the economy to adjust rapidly to new price 
ratios is by no means inevitable, if the deregulation of prices proceeds gradually (or if 
losses from deteriorating terms of trade for most affected industries are compensated by 
subsidies). The pace of liberalization has to be no faster than the ability of the economy 
to move resources from non-competitive (under the new market price ratios) to 
competitive industries. Therefore, it should be expected that there is a negative 
relationship between performance and the speed of liberalization. It should also be 
expected that the larger magnitude of distortions in industrial structure and trade 
patterns would lead to the greater reduction of output during the transformational 
recession, but would not have much of an impact on performance during the recovery 
stage (after the non-competitive sector would be shut down completely).   
 
(2)  The additional reason for the extreme depth of the transformational recession 
was associated with the institutional collapse; here differences between EE countries 
and FSU are striking. The adverse supply shock in this case came from the inability of 
the state to perform its traditional functions—to collect taxes and to constrain the 
shadow economy, to ensure property and contract rights, and law and order in general.   10
Naturally, poor ability to enforce rules and regulations did not create a business climate 
conducive to growth and resulted in the increased costs for companies. 
 
The measure of the institutional strength is the dynamics of the government expenditure 
during transition. This factor seems to have been far more important than the speed of 
reforms. In Kolodko’s (2004: 259) words ‘there can be no doubt that during the early 
transition there was a causal relationship between the rapid shrinkage in the size of 
government and the significant fall in output’. Keeping the government big does not 
guarantee favorable dynamics of output, since government spending has to be efficient 
as well. However, the sharp decline in government spending, especially for the 
‘ordinary government’, is a sure recipe to ensure the collapse of institutions and the fall 
in output accompanied by the growing social inequalities and populist policies.  
 
When real government expenditure falls by 50 per cent and more—as it happened in 
most CIS and South East European states in the short period of time under discussion—
there is practically no chance to compensate the decrease in the volume of financing by 
the increased efficiency of institutions. As a result, the ability of the state to enforce 
contracts and property rights, to fight criminalization, and to ensure law and order in 
general, falls dramatically (Popov 2009a). Thus, the story of the successes and failures 
of transition is not really the story of consistent shock therapy and inconsistent 
gradualism. The major plot of the post-socialist transformation ‘novel’ is the 
preservation of strong institutions in some countries (from Central Europe and Estonia 
to China, Uzbekistan, and Belarus)2 and the collapse of these institutions in others. At 
least 90 per cent of this story is about the government failure (strength of state 
institutions), not about the market failure (liberalization).  
 
It is precisely this strong institutional framework that should be held responsible for 
both—for the success of gradual reforms in China and shock therapy in Vietnam, where 
strong authoritarian regimes were preserved and CPE institutions were not dismantled 
before new market institutions were created; and for the relative success of radical 
reforms in EE countries, especially in Central European countries, where strong 
democratic regimes and new market institutions emerged quickly. And it is precisely the 
collapse of the strong state and institutions which began with the USSR in the late 
1980s and continued in the successor states in the 1990s that explains the extreme 
length, if not the extreme depth, of the FSU transformational recession.  
 
To put it differently, Gorbachev reforms of 1985-91 failed not because they were 
gradual, but due to the weakening of the state institutional capacity leading to the 
inability of the government to control the flow of events. Similarly, Yeltsin reforms in 
Russia, as well as economic reforms in most other FSU states, were so costly, not 
because of the shock therapy, but due to the collapse of the institutions needed to 
enforce law and order and carry out manageable transition. It turns out that the FSU 
transition model (with partial exemption of Uzbekistan, Belarus and Estonia) is based 
                                                 
2 Countries like Belarus and Uzbekistan fall into the same group with Central European countries and 
Estonia—with small reduction of state expenditure as a % of GDP during transition, good quality of 
governance, little bribery, a small shadow economy, and low state capture index (Hellman et al. 2000). In 
2005, Belarus and the Slovak Republic were the only two countries out of 25 surveyed in EE and FSU 
(BEEPS, Business Environment and Economic Performance Survey) where significant improvement was 
registered in 2002-05 in all seven areas of economic governance (judiciary, fighting crime and corruption, 
customs and trade, business licensing and permits, labour regulations, tax administration); EBRD (2005).   11
on a most unfortunate combination of unfavorable initial conditions, institutional 
degradation, and inefficient economic policies, such as macroeconomic populism and 
import substitution. 
 
What led to the institutional collapse and could it have been prevented? Using the 
terminology of political science, it is appropriate to distinguish between strong 
authoritarian regimes (China and Vietnam, and to an extent, Belarus and Uzbekistan), 
strong democratic regimes (Central European countries) and weak democratic regimes 
(most FSU and Balkan states). The former two are politically liberal or liberalizing—
i.e., protect individual rights, including those of property and contracts, and create a 
framework of law and administration—while the latter regimes, though democratic, are 
politically not so liberal since they lack strong institutions and the ability to enforce law 
and order (Zakaria 1997). This gives rise to the phenomenon of ‘illiberal democracies’, 
countries where competitive elections are introduced before the rule of law is 
established. While East European countries and East Asian countries recently moved 
from first establishing the rule of law to gradually introducing democratic elections 
(Hong Kong is the most obvious example of the rule of law without democracy), in 
Latin America, Africa, and CIS countries, democratic political systems were introduced 
into societies without the firm rule of law. 
 
Authoritarian regimes (including communist ones), while gradually building property 
rights and institutions, were filling the vacuum in the rule of law via authoritarian 
means. After democratization occurred and illiberal democracies emerged, they found 
themselves deprived of old authoritarian instruments to ensure law and order, but 
without the newly developed democratic mechanisms needed to guarantee property 
rights, contracts and law and order in general. No surprise that this had a devastating 
impact on the investment climate and output. There is a clear relationship between the 
ratio of rule of law index on the eve of transition to democratization index, on the one 
hand, and economic performance during transition, on the other. To put it differently, 
democratization without strong rule of law, whether one likes it or not, usually leads to 
the collapse of output. There is a price to pay for early democratization; i.e., the 
introduction of competitive elections of government under conditions when major 
liberal rights (personal freedom and safety, property, contracts, fair trial in court, etc.) 
are not well established. 
 
(3)  Finally, performance was of course affected by economic policy. Given the 
weak institutional capacity of the state—i.e., its poor ability to enforce its own 
regulations—economic policies could hardly be ‘good’. Weak state institutions usually 
imply populist macroeconomic policies (budget deficits resulting in high indebtedness 
and/or inflation, overvalued exchange rates), which have devastating impact on output. 
On the other hand, strong institutional capacity does not lead automatically to 
responsible economic policies. Examples range from the USSR before it collapsed 
(periodic outburst of open or hidden inflation) to such post-Soviet states as Uzbekistan 
and Belarus, which seem to have stronger institutional potential than other FSU states, 
but do not demonstrate higher macroeconomic stability.  
 
Regressions tracing the impact of all mentioned factors are reported in Table 1 (Popov 
2000). Eighty to 90 per cent of the variations in the dynamics of GDP in 1989-96 could 
be explained by the initial conditions (distortions and initial GDP per capita), 
institutional capacity of the state (decline in government revenues and rule of law and   12
democracy indices), and macroeconomic stability (inflation). If the rule of law and 
democracy indices are included into the basic regression equation, they have predicted 
signs (positive impact of the rule of law and negative impact of democracy) and are 
statistically significant (equation 1), which is consistent with the results obtained for 
larger sample of countries.3 The best explanatory power, however, is exhibited by the 
index that is computed as the ratio of the rule of law index to democracy index: 83 per 
cent of all variations in output can be explained by only three factors: pre-transition 
distortions, inflation, and rule-of-law-to-democracy index (Table 1, equation 2). If a 
liberalization variable is added, it turns out to be statistically insignificant and does not 
improve the goodness of fit (equation 3). At the same time, the ratio of the rule of law to 
democracy index and the decline in government revenues are not substitutes, but rather 
complement each other in characterizing the process of the institutional decay. These 
two variables are not correlated and improve the goodness of fit when included together 
in the same regression: R
2 increases to 91 per cent (equation 5); a better result than in 
regressions with either one of these variables. The liberalization index, when added to 
the same equation, is not statistically significant and has the ‘wrong’ sign. 
 
To test the robustness of the results, another year, 1998, for the end of the 
transformational recession was chosen so the period considered was 1989-98 (by the 
end of 1998 the absolute trough was reached in 24 out of 26 countries that experienced 
the recession). The adjusted R
2 is slightly lower, but the statistical significance of 
coefficients remains high (with the exception of the initial GDP per capita). The best 
equation is shown below:  
 
Log(Y98/89)=5.8-.006DIST-0.005Ycap87-0.39WAR-0.01GOVREVdecline-0.17logINFL-.003DEM 
(-2.48) (-0.09) (-3.22) (-2.94)    (-4.60) (-1.74)   
 
N = 28, adjusted R
2 = 82%, T-statistics in brackets, all variables are shown in the same order as in 
equation 7 from Table 1 (liberalization variable is omitted).  
 
Once again, if liberalization variable is introduced in this equation, it turns out to be 
insignificant.  
 
                                                 
3 For a larger sample of countries (all developing and developed countries, not only transition 
economies), the result is that there is a threshold level of the rule of law index: if it is higher than a certain 
level, democratization affects growth positively; if lower, democratization impedes growth (Polterovich 
and Popov 2007). For the regressions reported in Table 1 (to explain changes in output in 1989-96) 
averages of rule of law and democracy indices were used for the longer period (1989-98) to account for 
the fact that business agents often anticipate changes in business climate that are captured in experts’ 
estimates only later.     13
Table 1: Regression of change in GDP in 1989-96 on initial conditions, policy factors, rule of law and democracy indices (robust estimates)  














Constant  5.3*** 5.4*** 5.2*** 5.4*** 5.4*** 5.5*** 5.7*** 
Distortions, % of GDPa -0.005**  -0.005**  -0.003  -0.006**  -0.007***  -0.007***  -0.007*** 
1987 PPP GDP per capita, % of the US level  -0.009**  -0.006* -0.007** -0.007**  -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
War dummyb       -0.19
c -0.36***  -0.37***  -0.45*** 
Decline in government revenues as a % of 
GDP from 1989-91 to 1993-96 
     -0.011***  -0.011***  -0.011*** 
Liberalization  index     0.05    -0.02  0.03 
Log (inflation, % a year, 1990-95, geometric 
average)  
-0.16*** -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
Rule of law index, average for 1989-97, %  0.008***             
Democracy index, average for 1990-98, %   -0.005***            -0.003** 
Ratio of the rule of law to democracy index    0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05***   
Adjusted R2  %  82 83 83 85 91 91 90 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. aCumulative measure of distortions as a % of GDP equal to the sum of defense expenditure 
(minus 3% regarded as the 'normal' level), deviations in industrial structure and trade openness from the 'normal' level, the share of heavily distorted trade 
(among the FSU republics) and lightly distorted trade (with socialist countries) taken with a 33% weight; see Popov (2000) for details. bequals 1 for Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan, and 0 for all other countries. csignificant at 13% level. Dependent variable = log (1996 GDP as a % 
of 1989 GDP). For China, all indicators are for the period of 1979-86 or similar.  
Source: Popov (2000).  
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(4)  Finally, to deal with the endogeneity problem (liberalization affects 
performance, but is also affected by performance; if output falls, liberalization very 
likely would be halted) the liberalization variable was instrumented with the democracy 
level variable (Popov 2007a). The results are in Table 2; the main difference from Table 
1 is that liberalization now affects performance significantly and negatively.  
Table 2: 2SLS robust estimates: regression of change in GDP in 1989-96 on initial 
conditions, institutional capacity, liberalization, rule of law and democracy indices 
(liberalization index instrumented with the democracy level variable) 










Constant  6.4*** 6.3*** 6.0*** 6.0*** 
Pre-transition distortions, % of GDP -0.01***  -0.02***    -0.004 
1987 PPP GDP per capita, % of the US level  -0.007** -0.01***     
War dummya -0.45***  -0.29
b    
Liberalization index in 1995  -0.18**  -0.39*  -0.19***  -0.19*** 
Decline in government revenues as a % of GDP 
from 1989-91 to 1993-96 
-0.02*** -0.02***     
Log (inflation, % a year, 1990-95, geometric 
average)  
-1.7***  -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.19*** 
Rule of law index,  average for 1989-97, %    -0.01
c    
Increase in the share of shadow economy in 
GDP in 1989-94, pp  
   -0.02***  -0.015*** 
R2  %  86 77 88 90 
Note:  *, **, *** significant at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
aequals 1 for Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan and 0 for all other countries. 
bsignificant at 12% level. 
csignificant at 16% level. Dependent variable = Log (1996 GDP as a % 
of 1989 GDP). For China, all indicators are for the period of 1979-86 or similar. 
 
 
As argued in Popov (2007a), at the recovery stage (1998-2005), the impact of 
distortions on performance disappears but the influence of institutions persists, and the 
impact of the speed of liberalization (increment increase in liberalization index) 
becomes positive and significant. This is very much in line with the intuition; after the 
non-competitive sector is eradicated at the stage of transformation recession further 
liberalization (which inevitably becomes gradual at this point) cannot do much harm, 
whereas institutional capacity always affects growth.  
 
We end up with the scheme that summarizes factors affecting performance during 
transition (scheme 1). The FSU in general (there are some exceptions), and Russia in 
particular, had poor initial conditions—allocation of resources by industries and regions 
under central planning was very different from market type so when prices were 
deregulated, and allowed to govern the allocation of capital and labour, sizeable 
restructuring occurred leading to a recession. To add insult to injury, there was dramatic 
decline in institutional capacity of the state.  
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Scheme 1: Initial conditions (distortions) and institutions: classification of countries 
                                 Distortions 
Institutional capacity 
Low High 
High  China, Vietnam  Eastern Europe 
Low Albania,  Mongolia  FSU 
 
4  The mystery of the genesis of institutions 
The scheme leaves us with a frustrating conclusion that the bulk of the recession of the 
1990s was inevitable (initial conditions and institutions are exogenous, given by 
preceding developments) and economic policy (fast liberalization at early stages of 
development and poor macroeconomic policy) more often than not aggravated the 
recession. Besides, today, after the transformational recession, the prospects for the 
future seem to depend mostly on institutional capacity, which is the binding constraint 
for growth. With respect to distortions, gradual liberalization should have allowed 
avoiding the collapse of output. But would it have been possible to preserve strong 
institutions, as happened in EE and in China?  
 
Manufacturing growth is like cooking a good dish—all the ingredients need to be in the 
right proportions; if only one is under- or over-represented, the ‘chemistry of growth’ 
will not happen. Fast economic growth can materialize in practice only if several 
necessary conditions are met simultaneously. In particular, rapid growth requires a 
number of crucial inputs: infrastructure, human capital, even land distribution in 
agrarian countries, strong state institutions, economic stimuli, among other things. Once 
one of these crucial necessary ingredients is missing, the growth just does not take off. 
Rodrik et al. (2005) talk about ‘binding constraints’ that hold back economic growth; 
finding these constraints is the task of ‘growth diagnostics’. In some cases, these 
constraints are associated with the lack of market liberalization; in others, with the lack 
of state capacity or human capital or infrastructure. 
 
By the end of the 1970s, China had virtually everything that was needed for growth 
except liberalization of some markets (a much more easily introduced ingredient than 
human capital or institutional capacity). But even this seemingly simple task (economic 
liberalization) required careful management. The USSR was in a similar position in the 
late 1980s. True, the Soviet system lost its economic and social dynamism, the growth 
rates in the 1960s-80s were falling, life expectancy was not rising, and crime rates were 
slowly growing, but institutions were generally strong, human capital was large, which 
provided good starting conditions for reform. Nevertheless, economic liberalization in 
China (since 1979) and in the USSR, and later Russia (since 1989), produced markedly 
different outcomes (Popov 2000, 2007a).  
 
Why did economic liberalization work in Central Europe, but did not work in SSA and 
LA? The answer, according to the outlined approach, would be that in Central Europe 
the missing ingredient was economic liberalization, whereas in SSA and LA there was a 
lack of state capacity, not the lack of market liberalization. Why did liberalization work   16
in China and Central Europe but not work in the CIS? Because in the CIS it was carried 
out in such a way as to undermine state capacity—the precious heritage of socialist 
past—whereas in Central Europe, and even more so in China, the state capacity did not 
decline substantially during transition. The trick of transition, as is evident post factum, 
was not to carry out economic liberalization but to carry it out in such a way as to not 
throw the baby away with the bathwater—not to squander the precious achievements of 
the previous communist period in the form of strong institutions. China generally did 
not squander this heritage, even though government spending fell, income inequalities 
rose and crime rates increased, whereas Russia and most other CIS states did. 
 
Here lies the crucial question: how did some former communist countries retain their 
strong institutions during reforms, whereas in other countries institutional capacity, even 
if previously high, deteriorated? Why EE and China managed to preserve relatively 
strong institutions during economic liberalization, whereas in Russia state institutions 
collapsed? Part of the answer is the impact of democratization on the quality of 
institutions. As argued in previous papers (Polterovich and Popov 2007; Polterovich et 
al. 2007, 2008; Zakaria 1997), democratization carried out in a poor rule of law 
environment (weak state institutions) is associated with further weakening of 
institutions and with worsening of macroeconomic policy which has a negative impact 
on growth and does not allow for the creation of a stable democratic regime, especially 
in resource rich countries.4  
 
This is only part of the answer, however, because there are few examples of fast catch-
up development under democratic regimes (Japan after the Second World War, 
Botswana and Mauritius after gaining independence in the 1960s). Besides, democracy 
is an institution by itself, and it remains to be explained why some countries adopted it 
at earlier stages of development whereas other countries stayed authoritarian, or 
returned to authoritarianism, after short-lived experiments with democracy. And finally, 
differences in the institutional capacity of the state in countries with authoritarian 
regimes (say China, USSR, Russia) are huge and need to be explained.  
 
In an important paper by Acemoglu et al. (2001) the authors used an astute indicator for 
instrumenting the institutions variable; mortality rate among settlers in the colonies of 
major European states in the nineteenth century. The argument was that, if these 
mortality rates were very high (Gambia, Mali, Nigeria had mortality rates hundreds 
times higher than Australia, Bahamas, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, USA), the 
settlers did not bother to set up good institutions in those countries. It was also claimed 
that the local population was largely immune to the diseases that were life-threatening 
for the newcomers, so the settlers’ mortality rate did not affect economic growth 
                                                 
4 When growth of GDP per capita in 1975-99, y, is regressed on usual control variables (initial income 
levels, population growth rates, population density, investment/GDP ratios) and various indicators of 
institutional quality (share of shadow economy, WB indices of rule of law, government effectiveness, 
etc., corruption perception indices from Transparency International, investment risk indices) and 
democratization (increase in democratic ratings from Freedom House), the best result is usually the 
threshold equation, like the one below: 
 
   y = CONST. + CONTR.VAR. + 0.18Δ(RL – 0.72),  
  
where Δ – democratization (change in index of political rights in 1970-2000), RL – rule of law index (one 
of the indicators of the institutional capacity).   
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directly, but only via its impact on institutions. That is why this indicator can be used to 
resolve the endogeneity problem (institutions => growth => institutions) and to properly 
estimate the impact of institutions on growth. The authors concluded that, after 
controlling for the impact of institutions, the geographical location does not really have 
an impact on growth.  
 
An opposite view is advocated by Rodrik et al. (2002) in the article with a self 
explanatory title ‘Institutions Rule’. The authors examine the impact of three basic 
growth factors: geography (proxied by the distance to the equator and regional 
dummies); trade openness (the share of trade in GDP); and institutions. The difficulty, 
of course, is that all three factors are inter-linked and that institutions and trade 
openness not only influence growth, but depend on growth themselves. To estimate 
properly the contribution of each factor, they instrument institutions with the settlers’ 
mortality rate, like Acemoglu et al. (2001), and instrument the share of trade in GDP 
with the predicted share of trade (from gravity models). Then, after giving a ‘fair 
chance’ to geographical variable to compete with the instrumented variables of 
institutions and trade openness, they conclude that ‘institutions rule’, i.e. the impact of 
the institutions is most crucial. Institutions are largely, but not totally, determined by 
geography, and in turn they determine the trade openness and growth. The direct impact 
of geography on growth (apart from the impact through institutions) turns out to be 
insignificant.   
 
The difference with the straightforward geographical determinism approach is thus 
obvious, but there is an important difference with the Acemoglu et al. (2001) approach 
as well. Rodrik et al. (2002) believe that geography, in particular settlers’ mortality 
rates, is a good predictor of institutional quality but not the major cause of it. The 
genesis of institutions is a complex process with many determinants and finding an 
appropriate econometric instrument is not the same as finding the proper explanation. 
Rodrik (2004) explains the difference with the following example: the variation in GDP 
per capita in countries that were never colonies is no less substantial than among 
colonized countries;  here Ethiopia and Afghanistan are at the one end of the spectrum 
and Japan at the other end, with Turkey and Thailand lying somewhere in between. 
What accounts for the different quality of the institutions in this non-colonized part of 
the world?  
5 Long-term  perspective:  institutional  continuity versus transplantation of 
foreign institution 
A different interpretation of the genesis of the institutions in colonized and non-
colonized countries is the continuity perspective (Popov 2009b). All countries had 
traditional community structures in the past; everywhere before Reformation, under the 
Malthusian growth regime, the law of the land was what we now call ‘Asian values’—
the superiority of the interests of the community over the interests of the individuals. 
 
Colonization of sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and to a lesser extent South Asia, 
led to complete or near complete destruction of traditional (community) structures that 
were only partially replaced by the new Western-style institutions. Among large 
geographical regions, only East Asia, MENA, and to an extent South Asia, managed to 
retain traditional community institutions despite colonialism. It could be hypothesized   18
that those countries and regions that preserved traditional institutions in difficult times 
of colonialism and imposition of Western values retained a better chance for the catch-
up development than the less fortunate regions of the world periphery, where the 
continuity of the traditional structures was interrupted. Transplantation of institutions is 
a tricky business that works well only when tailored to the local traditions, so that it 
does not interrupt the institutional continuity (Polterovich 2001). Otherwise it leads 
either to complete elimination of the local structures (USA, Canada, Australia) or to 
non-viable mixture of old and new institutions that is not very conducive to growth 
(SSA, LA).  
 
If institutional capacity of the state is defined as the ability of the government to enforce 
rules and regulations, one of the natural measurement indicators is the murder rate. 
Crimes are registered differently in different countries; higher crime rates in developed 
countries seem to be the result of better registration of crimes. But grave crimes, like 
murders, appear to be registered pretty accurately even in developing countries, so 
international comparison of the murder rates is well warranted.  
Figure 8: Murder rate before and after transition in EE countries and FSU 




































































Source: WHO (2004).  
 
Among countries in transition Russia experienced the greatest increase in the murder 
rate; it quadrupled during 1987-2002, increasing from 8 to 33 per 100,000 inhabitants 
(Figure 8). In East European countries and most FSU states, the increases were much 
less pronounced. China during 1979-2009 also managed to better preserve the strong 
state institutions; the murder rate in China is still below 3 per 100,000 inhabitants as 
compared to about 30 in Russia in 2002 and about 20 in 2008 (Popov 2007d). The 
national statistics on murders under Mao regime is not available, but there is data for 
some provinces. In the 1970s the murder rate in the Shandong province was less than 1 
(Shandong 2009), and in 1987 it was estimated at 1.5 for the whole of China (WHO   19
2004). A two-to-threefold increase in the murder rate during the market reforms is 
comparable with the Russian increase, but the Chinese levels are nowhere near the 
Russian levels. 
 
It took Western countries 500 years to bring the murder rates from about a hundred to 
just a few (1 to 3) per 100,000 inhabitants (Figure 9). Even in the seventeenth century 
the murder rates in Western Europe were generally exceeding 10 per 100,000 of 
inhabitants—more than in many developing countries with similar levels of GDP per 
capita today. In fact among developing countries today we find two major patterns: low 
murder rates (1-3 per 100,000 inhabitants) in Eastern Europe, China and MENA 
countries (Figure 10), and high murder rates (15-75 murders per 100,000 inhabitants) in 
FSU, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa (Figure11). India (5.5), South East Asian 
countries (about 10, with the exception of Philippines where the rate is 21) fall in 
between the two groups. The argument is that countries that preserved collectivist 
institutions (East Asia, MENA countries, India) were able to retain institutional capacity 
of the state, whereas countries that eliminated these institutions while only partly 
replacing them with individual responsibility system (FSU, Latin America, and sub-
Saharan Africa) paid a high price in terms of diminished institutional capacity. Eastern 
Europe (with the exception of FSU states) could be the exception that proves the rule; it 
went through a period of low institutional capacity with high murder rates as did 
Western Europe between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries—although direct 
evidence here is lacking, all observations for Figure 9 are from Western Europe 
(England, Belgium, Netherlands, Scandinavia, Italy).5  
Figure 9: Long-term homicide rates in Europe per 100,000 inhabitants6 
 
Source: Eisner (2003).  
                                                 
5 Another anecdotal evidence of the strength of the collective institutions in East Asia, South Asia, 
MENA countries is the virtual absence of urban slums (Pomeranz 2008) and homeless children, which are 
found in abundance in LA, SSA, and FSU.  
6 Overall trend in homicide rates, all pre-modern local estimates and four national series. Note: All 398 
local estimates from the History of Homicide Database; national series for Sweden, England and Wales, 
Switzerland, and Italy.   20
Figure 10: Murders per 100,000 inhabitants and government effectiveness index in 
2002: countries with 1 to 3 murders per 100,000 inhabitants 
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Source: WDI (2005); WHO (2004). 
Figure 11: Murders per 100,000 inhabitants and government effectiveness index in 
2002: countries with 15 to 75 murders per 100,000 inhabitants 
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Source: WDI (2005); WHO (2004).   21
By European standards at the time, Russia had a very high murder rate (up to 10 and 
over per 100,000 inhabitants) in the beginning of the twentieth century, before first 
(1905-07) and second (1917) Russian revolutions (Figure 12). By the 1960s, it was 
down to 5-7 murders per 100,000 of inhabitants, even though mortality from other 
external causes increased markedly. By the mid 1960s, however, it was on the rise, 
approaching early twentieth century levels by the mid 1980s at about 10 murders per 
100,000 inhabitants (Figure 13).  
Figure 12: Death rate from external causes (per 100,000 of inhabitants): Russian 
Empire, RSFSR, RF, 1870-2000 (log scale)  
 
Note: 1=all external causes; 2=accidents; 3=suicides; 4=murders; 5=unknown; 6=work-related 
accidents.  
Source: Bogoyavlensky (2001). 
 
 
Another evidence of the cost of breakdown in institutional continuity comes from data 
on income inequality in pre-modern societies. The destruction of communal, collectivist 
institutions that was first carried out in Western countries during the sixteenth to 
nineteenth centuries was accompanied by the increase in income inequalities. The 
available data (Milanovic et al. 2007) suggest that in England, Holland and Spain in the 
eighteenth century the Gini coefficient of income distribution was at a level of 50 and 
even 60 per cent (Figure 14)7—an extremely high level according to today’s standards 
and, most probably, according to the standards of the distant past (about 40 per cent in 




                                                 
7 In England and Wales the Gini coefficient increased from 46 per cent in 1688 to 53 per cent in the 
1860s (Saito 2009). 
8 Very high income inequalities in low-income countries mean that a lot of people find themselves in 
extreme poverty, below subsistence level, which leads to high mortality.    22
Figure 13: Murders, suicides, deaths from alcohol poisoning and consumption of 
alcohol in Russia in 1970-2007 
 
Source: Goskomstat (various years); Nemtsov (2006).  
Figure 14: Gini coefficient in developed countries, 1550-2000 
 
Source: Milanovic et al. (2007).   23
Figure 15: Predicted inequality in Latin America 1491-19299  
 
Source: Williamson (2009). 
Figure 16: Gini coefficient in developing countries, 1800-2000 
 
Source: Milanovic et al. (2007). 
                                                 
9 These are not the actual Ginis, but predicted Ginis reconstructed using regression equation mentioned 
above.   24
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Source: WHO (2004); WDI (2005).    25
The income inequality story for developing countries is quite consistent with the 
dynamics of the institutional capacity—in SSA, LA, FSU, where the institutional 
continuity was interrupted and institutional capacity weakend, inequalities increased and 
remain high today. Regressions, linking pre-statistical Gini coefficients of income 
distribution to per capita GDP, population density, urbanization and colonial status (plus 
some variables to control for different quality of the data) suggest that colonialism 
increased inequalities greatly: colonies had Ginis nearly 13 percentage points higher 
than non-colonies (Williamson 2009). In LA as a whole inequalities increased from 22.5 
per cent 1491 to over 60 per cent in 1929 (Figure 15). On the contrary, India, China and 
Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had a more balanced income 
distribution (Figure 16; Pomerantz 2000; Saito 2009).10 In MENA, EE, India and East 
Asia (especially until the 1990s) inequalities were noticeably lower (Figure 16). Income 
inequalities, of course, go together with weak institutional capacity, as measured by the 
murder rate (Figure 17).  
 
To summarize, there are two ways to escape the Malthusian trap: (1) eliminating 
collectivist institutions and allowing for the costly increase in income inequalities and 
savings/investment rate at the very early stage of development at the expense of the 
consumption of the masses; (2) maintaining collectivist institutions and keeping the 
income inequalities relatively low until slow technological progress and rise in 
productivity allows to begin accumulating capital at a pace surpassing population 
growth rates. The first way was taken by countries that are now called Western and was 
associated with dramatic social costs between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Moreover, it was imposed on part of the developing world in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries during an era of colonialism. In the developing world this 
Westernization attempt created an institutional vacuum—traditional, collectivist 
structures were destroyed, whereas the new modern institutions did not take root, which 
led to even greater costs than several centuries before in the West.  
 
On the contrary, those developing countries that managed to resist the Westernization of 
their institutions and to preserve institutional continuity as well as relatively low 
inequalities (East Asia, MENA countries, India) did not gain much in terms of 
economic growth before the mid 1900s, but were better positioned to take advantage of 
growth opportunities as soon as natural increases in productivity allowed exiting the 
Malthusian trap. The other countries that destroyed their egalitarian institutions 
prematurely (replicating the Western path) experienced tremendous declines in 
institutional capacity and rise in inequalities. In India, China, and SSA this path was 
associated with periodic mass famines, which did not happen before colonialism due to 
even distribution of limited food resources by the community institutions.11 In more 
                                                 
10 In Japan Gini coefficient allegedly increased from 34 per cent in 1860 to 56% in 1940, but then fell to 
30-40 per cent in the 1960-90s (Saito 2009).  
11 ‘… Even before the onset of the Victorian famines, warning signals were in place: C. Walford showed 
in 1878 that the number of famines in the first century of British rule had already exceeded the total 
recorded cases in the previous two thousand years. But the grim reality behind claims to ‘good 
governance’ truly came to light in the very decades that Ferguson trumpets. According to the most 
reliable estimates, the deaths from the 1876–1878 famine were in the range of six to eight million, and in 
the double-barreled famine of 1896–1897 and 1899–1900, they probably totaled somewhere in the range 
of 17 to 20 million. So in the quarter century that marks the pinnacle of colonial good governance, famine 
deaths average at least a million per year’ (Chibber 2005). In China famines claimed 8,000 lives a year in 
1644-1795, 92,000 lives in 1796-1871, 260,000 lives in 1871-1911, and 583,000 lives in 1911-47. The   26
developed LA countries the growth rates in the twentieth century did not allow 
narrowing the gap with the West (Argentina, a developed country in between the two 
world wars, even fell out of the club after the Second World War). In short, premature 
dismantling of collectivist institutions, even when allowing to overcome the Malthusian 
trap, did now allow for healthy growth: 
 
The frequent claim that inequality promotes accumulation and growth 
does not get much support from history. On the contrary, great economic 
inequality has always been correlated with extreme concentration of 
political power, and that power has always been used to widen the 
income gaps through rent-seeking and rent-keeping, forces that 
demonstrably retard economic growth (Milanovic et al. 2007). 
 
This explains differences in the long-term development trajectory of institutions in 
China and Russia. The Chinese 1949 Liberation was similar to the Russian 1917 
Revolution, not only because communists came to power in both countries but because 
traditional collectivists institutions, ruined by preceding Westernization, were re-
established and strengthened. However, in Russia 1917-91 the communist regime just 
interrupted the process of transplantation of Western institutions that had been going on 
since at least the seventeenth century, whereas in China the Liberation of 1949 just 
returned the country to long-term institutional trajectory that was briefly (and only 
partly) interrupted after the Opium Wars.  
 
To put it differently, Russia had been already Westernized before 1917, and collectivist 
institutions that were introduced in Russia by the 1917 Revolution had been largely 
alien to previous long-term institutional development. China, on the contrary, aborted 
the unsuccessful Westernization attempt (1840-1949) and returned to collectivist (Asian 
values) institutions. What was a passing episode and deviation from the trend in Russia 
was a return to the mainstream development and a restoration of a long-term trend in 
China. Hence, economic liberalization from 1979 onwards in China, even though 
accompanied by growing income inequalities and crime and murder rates, has not 
resulted so far in institutional collapse. 
6 Conclusions 
After allowing for differing initial conditions, it turns out that the fall in output in 
transition economies was associated mostly with poor business environment, resulting 
from institutional collapse. Liberalization alone, when it is not complemented with 
strong institutions, cannot ensure good performance. Institutional capacities in turn, 
depend to a large extent on the combination of the rule of law and democracy. The data 
seem to suggest that both authoritarian and democratic regimes can have strong rule of 
law and can deliver efficient institutions, whereas under a weak rule of law authoritarian 
regimes do a better job of maintaining efficient institutions than democracies. To put it 
in a shorter form, the record of illiberal democracies in ensuring institutional capacities 
is the worst, which predictably has a devastating impact on output.  
                                                                                                                                               
1876-79 famine alone took at least 10 million lives, more than all preceeding famines since 1644 (Xia 
Mingfang calculations cited in Pomerantz 2006).   27
 
Why do illiberal democracies emerge? Why did Russia became one of them? It was 
argued that the group of developing countries that willingly and unwillingly 
(colonialism) transplanted Western institutions (LA, FSU, SSA) ended up with high 
income inequalities and apparent lack of institutional capacity. On the contrary, the 
other group of developing countries—regions that has never really departed from the 
collectivist institutions and preserved institutional continuity (EA, India, MENA)—
succeeded in maintaining low income and wealth inequalities. This second group of 
countries may have stayed in the Malthusian growth regime longer than others, but once 
technical progress allowed them to exit from the Malthusian trap, their starting 
conditions for economic growth in terms of institutional capacity turned out to be better 
than in the first group. If this interpretation is correct, the next large regions of 
successful catch up development would be MENA Islamic countries (Turkey, Iran, 
Egypt, etc.) and South Asia (India), whereas Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and 
Russia would fall behind.  
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